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Increasingly child advocates have become involved with persistent litigation in order to 
improve the performance of publicly administered state child welfare agencies. However, 
strategic plans for change are often implemented without sufficient attention given to 
assessing the level of and strengthening organizational structural capacity to support 
system-wide change. Using the conceptual foundation of organizational structural capacity 
by Hall et al. (2003), a two agency case study was conducted examining the structural 
capacity factors of relationships and networks, infrastructure and process, and planning 
and development in the context of litigated reform of the Washington State and New Jersey 
child welfare agencies. Examination of panel meeting minutes, monitoring reports, and 
other court documents revealed significant weaknesses in the three structural capacity 
areas that may have contributed to the failure to attain or maintain half of required 
performance benchmarks by the end of multi-year court oversight.  
 
Publicly administered state child welfare agencies are complex bureaucratic systems that 
regardless of funding, staff levels, or resource availability are charged with ensuring the 
safety, permanency, and well-being of children from abuse and neglect (Blome and Steib 
2007, 3; Ellett et al. 2007, 265). In an era of competing interests, funding cuts, and failed 
bureaucratic institutions, child welfare advocates increasingly have used class action 
litigation as a tool for child welfare agency reform using the premise of failure to protect the 
constitutional/legal rights of children in the care or custody of the state (Bertelli 2004, 28; 
Kim 2005, 149). 
Along with critical factors such as workers, resource availability, and funding, the 
level of organizational structural capacity is an essential component in an agency’s ability to 
carry out organizational tasks (Hall et al. 2003). Often at the root of failed reform efforts to 
improve an institution’s ability to achieve its mission and performance goals is insufficient 
structural capacity marked by disrupted leadership, unclear or weak support for policies and 
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procedures, and ineffective plans and strategies (Center for the Study of Social Policy [CSSP] 
2012a, vi; Hall et al. 2003). Through litigation, child welfare advocates leverage the power 
of the court to engage leaders’ examination of organizational capacity and functioning and 
seriously address chronically inefficient and ineffective system practices (Bertelli 2004, 34). 
Parameters of system change and performance requirements outlined in litigated settlement 
agreements hold political, bureaucratic, and professional entities accountable for working 
collaboratively to implement strategic reform to improve of failed systems (Bertelli 2004, 28-
29; CSSP 2012a, vii).  
For years the Washington State and New Jersey child welfare agencies operated 
disconnected bureaucracies with insufficient funding and resources, high turnover, 
inadequately trained workforce, poor stakeholder relationships, and frequent leadership 
changes. Through class action litigation against these state agencies, child welfare advocates 
required system-wide changes governed by a court approved settlement agreement with panel 
or monitor oversight.  
In addition to human resources and financial support, an organization’s structure of 
relationship networks, leadership, processes, and strategic plans is a determinant of its ability 
to achieve its stated mission and goals (Hall et al. 2003; Vincent 2012, 12). The theoretical 
concepts of organizational structural capacity developed by Hall et al. (2003) was used to 
examine Washington State and New Jersey child welfare agency organizational structural 
capacity issues within the context of litigated reform and the ability of these agencies to 
achieve compliance with the provisions of their settlement agreements. 
A two agency case study involving an analysis of panel meeting notes, monitoring 
reports and court documents was used to assess key structural capacity factors during litigated 
mandated reform and panel/monitor oversight. This article begins with an overview of 
Washington State’s Braam v. State of Washington (2003) and New Jersey’s Charlie and 
Nadine H. v. McGreevey (2003) class action lawsuits, followed by a discussion of the 
conceptual foundation for organizational structural capacity, the study methodology, research 
findings, and discussion of the findings in relation to structural capacity building in child 
welfare agencies. 
 
Case Overview: Litigated Reform in Washington State and New Jersey 
Washington State: Braam v. State of Washington 
In 1998, Children’s Rights, a New York based child advocacy group filed suit 
against Washington State Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) claiming that 
multiple placements while in the custody of Children’s Administration (CA) Division of 
Children and Family Services, the child welfare agency under DSHS, had violated the 
constitutional rights of children to be treated in a manner that comports with professional 
practice standards (Braam 101 2007, 1). The primary goal of the lawsuit was to reduce 
multiple foster care placements and raise to professional practice standards the provision of 
care for agency clientele (Braam 101 2007, 2). 
Following court ordered mediation, a settlement agreement (SA) containing thirty-
three required performance outcomes was approved by the court on November 9, 2004 
(Braam 101 2007, 2; Walters 2011). While system-wide reform was required, areas of 
particular focus included placement stability and safety, mental health services, foster parent 
training, sibling separation/visitation, and services for youth aging out of the system (Braam 
101 2007, 3).  
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As part of the SA, the court appointed a six member Braam Oversight Panel (BOP) 
that provided consulting and technical assistance in developing and implementing the reform 
plan, monitored compliance, and issued a bi-annual reports of CA’s progress meeting 
performance outcome benchmarks (Braam 101 2007, 2). The BOP presented an 
implementation plan in February 2006 and a revised plan in July 2008 that outlined specific 
performance goals, benchmarks and outcomes: full compliance was achieved when outcome 
benchmark levels were maintained for eighteen consecutive months (BOP 2013b, 2-3). 
In October 2011, a revised/exit agreement replaced the original SA in force from 
2004-2011; the exit agreement ended panel oversight in June 2013 and extended monitoring 
for twenty-six months through December 2013 (BOP 2013b, 3). The revised SA included 
twenty-one enforceable outcomes, most notably, monthly caseworker health and safety visits, 
sibling placement/visitation, and stable placements (BOP 2009; 2013b, 3). 
The Braam Panel held public meetings quarterly between December 2004 and 
December 2012 with bi-annual reports published from March 2006 through May 2013. In 
2008, after CA failed to make adequate progress, the plaintiffs took DSHS back to court for 
noncompliance of the settlement agreement (BOP 2013a, ii). A revised reform plan was 
created that reduced required performance outcomes from thirty-three to twenty-one (BOP 
2013a, ii). After seven years of court oversight, there was little improvement of the SA 
outcomes especially in reducing the high number of placements, the primary complaint for 
which the Braam lawsuit was brought (BOP 2011a). At the end of the original SA in 2011, 
CA only had completed four of twenty-one outcomes (BOP 2011a, ii) and by the end of 2012, 
CA had achieved compliance only for five of the twenty-one enforceable outcomes (BOP 
2013a, ii).  
New Jersey: Charlie and Nadine H. v McGreevey 
Children’s Rights filed a class action lawsuit against the New Jersey Department of 
Health Services (DHS) and the Department of Children and Families (DCF) i on August 4, 
1999. The plaintiffs alleged DCF was so poorly managed, grossly overburdened, and under 
resourced that children were denied safety, permanency, and well-being (Kite and McCauley 
2003, 3) and the rate of abuse and neglect of children in the New Jersey foster care system 
was twelve times higher than the national norm (Kosanovich, Joseph, Hasbargen 2005, 45).  
The lawsuit remained unresolved for three years (Kite and McCauley 2003, 3). In 
2003, Governor McGreevey broke the stalemate following the death of a child while in state 
custody and an article published by the New York Times detailing gross deficiencies in DCFs 
Department of Youth and Family Services (DYFS) that placed children in unsafe living 
conditions (Livio and Patterson 2004). McGreevey ordered DHS/DCF to settle the lawsuit, 
restructured the state child welfare system, and hired a new DHS commissioner (Jones and 
Kaufman 2003). The litigated settlement agreement (SA) included a court appointed 
oversight panel (CSSP replaced the panel in June 2010) served as consultants and monitored 
compliance with SA requirements (CSSP 2007, 1; Jones and Kaufman 2003). Between 2004 
and 2012, CSSP published bi-annual reports detailing DHS/DCF progress meeting SA 
performance outcomes.  
In June 2004, the court approved a reform plan with goals, outcomes, and 
performance compliance deadlines for eleven areas of foster care (Jones and Kaufman, 2003). 
Following a non-compliance contempt ruling against DHS in December 2005, the plaintiffs 
and the state negotiated a modified settlement agreement (MSA) approved in July 2006 
(CSSP 2007, 1). The MSA requirements were implemented in a two phase process. Phase 1 
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(7/2006-12/2008) focused on establishing a strong infrastructure (CSSP 2009a, 1-2) then 
transitioned to Phase II beginning January 2009 with increasingly higher performance 
expectations in direct practice staged over the course of the settlement agreement (CSSP 
2008b, 3; 2009a, 7; 2010a, 7). By June 2012, DCF had met twenty-one of the fifty-four Phase 
II performance measures specified in the MSA and improved performance in fourteen other 
measures (CSSP 2012c, 3). The monitor would continue oversight until all court-ordered 
performance requirements were met (CSSP 2012c, 3).  
 
Methods 
A case study method (Yin 1994) was used to investigate organizational structural 
capacity issues within the context of class action litigated reform (Cooper 1988, 6). The case 
study method is appropriate for understanding the complex nature of litigated reform of 
publicly administered child welfare agencies because it provides a means of studying 
multifaceted issues within the real-life context of large bureaucratic institutions (Yin 1994, 
1). The Washington State and New Jersey cases were selected for the study based on six 
criteria: (a) class action lawsuit based on the violation of statutory/constitutional rights of 
children; (b) the lawsuit resulted in system-wide reform; (c) the litigated reform took place 
during similar time periods between 2003 and 2013; (d) reform requirements were stipulated 
in a court approved settlement agreement; (e) involved a court appointed oversight 
panel/monitor; and (f) the defendants have exited or were exit court supervision by December 
2013. Analysis involved an examination of publicly accessible court documents, oversight 
panel meeting minutes, and published monitoring reports.  
Case studies provide insight and broad understanding of issues in their natural 
contexts by using multiple sources of information (Creswell 1994, 12). While the findings of 
the current study may not be generalizable across all publicly administered state child welfare 
agencies, conceptual generalizations can be drawn that contribute to the body of knowledge 
by adding multiple perspectives that might be transferable to similar contexts (Yin, 1994). 
The implementation of reform to satisfy settlement agreements requirements involved 
substantial changes that effected organizational structural capacity. Using the conceptual 
framework of organizational structural capacity by Hall et al. (2003, 4), the litigated reform 
process was examined within the context of the agency’s structural capacity to support 
relationships with stakeholders, organizational infrastructure and process, and planning and 
development. 
 
Organizational Structural Capacity 
The term “capacity” is broadly used and conceptualized in the literature as 
multidimensional, dynamic, and changing (Boigey and Cumenal 2011, 7; Hall et al. 2003, 4; 
Misener and Doherty 2009, 458). Organizational capacity is the collective ability to utilize a 
set of resources within a multidimensional structure to accomplish tasks by converting 
strategic aims into action (Boigey and Cumenal 2011, 7). Organizational structural capacity 
describes the extent an organization possess critical structures and processes necessary to 
complete organizational tasks and objectives (Hall et al. 2003, 5; Mackay et al. 2002, 130; 
Misener and Doherty 2009, 458). Weak organizational structural capacity is associated with 
a poor history of achieving the institutional mission and goals (Eisinger 2002, 115; Kaplan 
2000, 50; Misener and Doherty 2009, 458). While it is difficult to provide a universal model 
for organizational excellence, a significant contributing factor is the organizational structural 
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capacity that supports the forming of networks and relationships, infrastructure and processes, 
and planning and development (Boigey and Cumenal 2011, 11; Jones 2003, 17).  
Conceptual Foundation of Organizational Structural Capacity 
Organizational structural capacity is multidimensional and integral to the ability of 
an agency to fulfill its mission and realize its goals through a combination of organizational 
hierarchy, design and coordination of functions, job and role clarity, and the shape of the 
organization’s leadership and legal structures (Jones 2003, 18). Structural capacity refers to 
the ability of an organization to utilize non-financial capital that is embedded in the 
organizational system. Hall et al. (2003, 4) developed a three dimension conceptual model 
for understanding organizational capacity to produce desired outcomes that includes the 
interconnectedness of humans resources, structural formation and processes, and financial 
foundation (Hall et al. 2003, 6, 8, 13). This organizational capacity model is applicable to 
understanding the complex dynamics of publicly administered child welfare agencies by 
providing a framework using broad dimensions that are adaptable to various nonprofit-like 
organizational contexts (Misener and Doherty 2009, 463). Organizational structural capacity, 
the second dimension of the Hall et al. (2003) organizational capacity model was used as the 
conceptual foundation for the examination of structural capacity within the context of 
litigated reform among the Washington State and New Jersey child welfare systems.  
Organizational capacity is dependent on an organizational structure that supports 
strategic planning, decision-making, knowledge management, information technology, and 
administrative structures that facilitate the ability of an organization to achieve its mission 
and goals (Hall et al. 2003, 25, 27; Jones 2003, 18). Within child welfare agencies, 
modifications in organizational structure can change the mission and goals of the entire 
agency or divisions within it, alter priorities and strategies, shift authority and power 
structures, weaken or strengthen networks and stakeholder relationships, and affect the 
availability of resources and human capital (Hall et al. 2003, 15, 38, 72, 93). According to 
Hall et al. (2003, 6), three types of organizational structural capacity that affect organizational 
capacity include (a) relationships and networks, (b) infrastructure and process, and (c) 
planning and development.  
Relationship and network capacity relates to an institution’s social norms, networks, 
and trust that facilitate the mutually beneficial sharing of resources, knowledge, and 
experience through coordination and cooperation (Hall et al. 2003, 6; Putnam 1995, 17). This 
includes the ability to draw on relationships with clients, stakeholders, funding entities, 
governmental agencies, legislatures, media, and the public (Misener and Doherty 2009, 463). 
Critical to the success in developing and implementing organizational strategies is 
stakeholder input, expertise, resource support, and advocacy for the needs of the agency 
(Vincent 2012, 9).  
Infrastructure and process capacity relates to the ability of an organization to use 
institutional elements related to day-to-day operations and is influenced by the extent that the 
organizational structure supports information systems, policies, procedures, and culture (Hall 
et al. 2003, 6). Affecting infrastructure and processes is the recent trend among state 
legislatures to mandate use of performance based contracting of services typically provided 
by the agency. Use of private contractors is expected to leverage market competition to lower 
operations costs and reduce the financial burden on taxpayers (Johnston and Romzek 1999, 
383, 385).  
Finally, planning and development capacity refers to the ability of an organization 
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to develop and use organizational strategic and program plans, policies, and proposals and is 
influenced by the extent organizational members can access and utilize organizational 
resources (Hall et al. 2003, 6; Misener and Doherty 2009, 463). Strategic planning capacity 
is affected by insufficient human resources and uncertainties about future funding and 
funding constraints (Eisinger 2002, 118; Hall et al. 2003, 37; Misener and Doherty 2009, 
463). The lack of sufficient funding and loss of long-term workers with institutional 
knowledge and experience can pose the greatest threat to sustained planning and development 
capacity (Misener and Doherty 2009, 463). 
 
Results 
Publicly accessible court documents, oversight panel meeting minutes, and 
monitoring reports related to the litigated reform as outlined in court approved settlement 
agreements for the Washington State v. Braam (2003) and Charlie and Nadine H. v. 
McGreevey (2003) class action lawsuits were examined in the context of the three types of 
organizational structural capacity described in the Hall et al. (2003) conceptual model for 
understanding organizational capacity: (a) relationships and networks, (b) infrastructure and 
process, and (c) planning and development.  
Structural Capacity: Relationships and Networks 
Washington.  DSHS/CA dealt extensively with the plaintiffs, oversight panel, 
stakeholders, state legislature, and external agencies providing child welfare related services. 
Integral to structural capacity and meeting the settlement agreement requirements was CAs 
ability to improve communication, form constructive working relationships with 
stakeholders, facilitate the development of networks supporting agency tasks, and collaborate 
with the state legislature in passing child welfare legislation, and acquire information. 
Initial meetings of the Braam panel, plaintiffs, and CA were marked by antagonism 
and resistance in resolving outcome definitions and benchmark target issues (BOP 2008a), 
data requirements and measurement methodology (BOP 2007c), and strategy development 
and implementation (BOP 2008a). Due to lack of detail and weak strategies, CA experienced 
ongoing difficulty submitting compliance plans acceptable to the panel (BOP 2008b). Over 
time, interactions became more collegial and collaborative in developing measurable 
operational definitions and performance outcome targets (BOP 2005; 2008b; 2010a). 
Children’s Administration leaders fostered engagement with stakeholders (e.g., 
parents, caregivers, child advocacy representatives) and the state legislature in the reform 
process. At public panel meetings, stakeholders provided input about programs and services 
(BOP 2007b; 2009a; 2009c; 2010b; 2011b). Increased communication facilitated 
commitment from private entities to support the agency through investment in structural 
operation needs and child welfare programs and services (BOP 2010b; 2010c). By 2012, CA 
had significantly improved relationships with the foster parent community and other key 
stakeholders (BOP 2012b; 2012c). The Braam lawsuit facilitated positive collaboration with 
the state legislature in making funding decisions and passing child welfare legislation (BOP 
2007c; 2007d; 2009c; 2012b).  
Finally, the inability of CA caseworkers and other staff to access information from 
state and federal agencies (e.g., school districts, law enforcement, healthcare providers) often 
was cited as a barrier to effective case management (BOP 2005; 2008a).  To improve access 
to external agency information, the state legislature provided CA a court order process to 
expedite obtaining foster child health and education information (BOP 2007b; 2007d; 2008a). 
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New Jersey. The leaders of DHS/DCF worked closely with the panel to develop an 
implementation plan, performance outcomes, and benchmarks. The monitor identified 
inadequate progress in critical areas (e.g., screening, case planning, caseworker visits, family 
team meetings) (CSSP 2009b, 8-9; 2010b, 8; 2011a, 7; NJCWP 2005b, 11); periodically 
participated in DCF’s quality assurance process (CSSP 2012a, 2), and provided technical 
guidance in the modification of benchmarks to facilitate improved performance and outcome 
compliance (CSSP 2009b, 103). However, collaboration between the panel and the DHS/DCF 
leadership was hampered by tension created over pressures from the plaintiffs for the New 
Jersey legislature to elevate DCF to a cabinet level agency (CSSP 2009b, 8-9; 2010b, 8; 
2011a, 7; NJCWP 2005b, 11). 
A primary goal of DCF was to re-engage with critical stakeholders and rebuild 
public confidence and trust (CSSP 2011b, 75; NJCWP 2005b, 12). Early in the reform 
process, DHS/DCF failed to engage community stakeholders in collaborative partnerships 
that supported the work of the agency (NJCWP 2005a, 10-11). Stakeholders were frustrated 
by DHS/DCF lack of clarity on the help needed, frequent leadership changes, lack of 
transparency in operations, and confusion about various organizational questions related to 
DCF (NJCWP 2005b, 78).  
The Department of Children and Families experienced difficulty accessing 
information and coordinating care across diverse state government agencies (e.g., Medicaid 
HMOs) and contracted mental health service providers (NJCWP 2005b, 55) that negatively 
affected DCFs ability to achieve performance benchmarks (CSSP 2011b, 129). As the reform 
progressed, DCF improved its collaborative working relationships with external service 
providers, policy experts from other state agencies, child advocacy groups, and private 
agencies (CSSP 2012a, 154).  
Structural Capacity: Infrastructure and Process 
The Washington and New Jersey child welfare agencies faced infrastructure and 
process problems related to the SACWIS case management system technology, quality 
assurance mechanisms, diffusion of the agency professional practice model, managing 
performance based contracts, and changes in leadership and agency organizational structure.  
SACWIS Case Management System 
Washington. In 2009, CA converted to the new FamLink SACWIS case 
management system. Though the original launch date was September 2008, system 
conversion did not begin until February 2009 (BOP 2007d; 2009a) during which periods of 
data loss, unreliability, and inaccessibility prevented CA from assessing several performance 
benchmarks (BOP 2010a; 2009a; 2009b). Budget cuts during conversion to the new system 
negatively impacted on-site support for field staff (BOP 2009d). With the resolution of data 
management problems, FamLink provided case management capabilities and quality 
assurance mechanisms that strengthened structural capacity to manage data and track progress 
meeting performance outcomes. 
New Jersey. In 2007, DCF converted to an updated SACWIS case management 
system, NJ SPIRIT (CSSP 2009a, 45; NJCWP 2004, 13). After a one year delay, NJ SPIRIT 
was launched statewide August 2007 (CSSP 2008b; 2009a, 45). Conversion problems 
resulted in unreliable or inaccessible data (CSSP 2008a, 7; NJCWP 2005b, 38) that impeded 
caseworker ability to provide appropriate and expedient services (CSSP 2008b, 6). Integration 
of the new system in day-to-day operations was delayed due to ongoing technical problems 
(CSSP 2008a, 8) and lack of staff competency using NJ SPIRIT (CSSP 2008b, 15). Diffusion 
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of the technology was facilitated by the inclusion of super users who provided staff with 
guided practice in data input and access (CSSP 2008b, 6). After several years, most NJ 
SPIRIT system problems were resolved, worker competency increased significantly, and the 
system provided a broad range of data on benchmark and performance outcomes progress 
(CSSP 2008a, 30; 2010b, 12).  
 
Quality Assurance Mechanisms 
Washington. Children’s Administration had ongoing difficulty implementing a 
quality assurance system due to FamLink migration problems that: (a) limited data access and 
reliability (BOP 2006a; 2009a), (b) led to insufficient documentation and failure to maintain 
FamLink case records (BOP 2010c; 2012b), and (c) failed to capture information from 
external service providers (BOP, 2005b). FamLink technical problems caused delays or the 
outright inability of CA to demonstrate compliance with benchmark requirements (BOP, 
2010a). On several occasions, data problems necessitated the panel change outcome 
definitions and/or measurement parameters due to the inability to continue to track progress 
of an existing outcome (BOP 2006a; 2007d; 2010a). However, once FamLink was fully 
operational, quality assurance mechanisms were integrated into the system to monitor 
organizational activities directly related to care (e.g., supervisor case reviews and caseworker 
alerts) (BOP 2010a; 2012c).  
New Jersey. The Department of Children and Families experienced a weak quality 
assurance program (CSSP 2009a, 9; 2010b, 10-11; NJCWP 2004, 6). Data collection and 
reliability problems existed for several years during which workers resorted to alternative 
methods (e.g., hand counts) because programs did not exist to pull together or provide 
consistently reliable data (CSSP 2008b, 6). Unreliable quality assurance assessments due to 
data problems limited the ability of the agency to demonstrate outcome performance trends 
or compliance over time (CSSP 2008b, 39; NJCWP 2005b, 26).  
The Department of Children and Families experienced problems aligning the 
qualitative review process to assess case practice performance benchmarks (CSSP 
2010a, 11). After several delays, in 2010 a new quality assurance system (ChildStat) was 
implemented that used data from multiple sources (e.g., caseworkers, clinicians, resource 
parents) to assess service delivery (CSSP 2009b, 10; 2012b, 5). The quality assurance 
program helped leaders pinpoint barriers to quality case practice and identify effective 
strategies, policies, and practices for improving agency performance (CSSP 2012c, 5). 
Implementing the Professional Practice Model  
Washington. Children’s Administration experienced problems implementing a new 
solutions-based casework practice model (SBC) to guide professional practice (BOP 2007d; 
2008d). The SBC model was generally well received system-wide (BOP 2008c). However, 
supervisors expressed frustration with expectations to integrate the values and principles of 
the model at the field level without adequate guidance from management (BOP 2008d; 
2012c). Lack of training support and budget cuts (BOP 2009b) led to inconsistent or delayed 
application of the model across the agency (BOP 2008d) especially in terms of conducting 
timely Family Team Decision Meetings (FTDM), a critical component at the field level for 
case management, service provisions, and placement stability for children placed in out-of-
home care (BOP 2009b). 
New Jersey. Training on the Case Practice Model (CPM) developed collaboratively 
by DCF and the plaintiffs (CSSP 2008a, 9) began in November 2007 (CSSP 2008a, 21). Poor 
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training capacity and support of the new model system-wide resulted in failure to meet critical 
performance standards (e.g., family team meetings and case planning) (CSSP 2008b, 5; 
2011a, 7, 11). Local agency office leaders were responsible for field-level training and 
support; however, inconsistent application of the CPM among local leaders and field level 
staff demonstrated continued lack of competency in CPM use (CSSP 2008b, 5; 2009a, 35, 
51; 2009b, 68).  
A significant challenge for DCF to create an integrated service delivery system 
structure was diffusion of the principles and values of the CPM throughout the extended child 
welfare system and among, judges, attorneys, and service providers (CSSP 2008b, 5, 44; 
2009b, 69; 2010a, 69; NJCWP 2005a, 7). As a result, due to inconsistent application of the 
CPM among external entities, DCF experienced ongoing problems meeting outcome targets 
related to some of the case practice standards (CSSP 2008b, 5; 2009a, 51; 2010, 7, 69, 74).  
To facilitate competency and consistency in application of the CPM, an immersion 
training program was implemented with an emphasis on modeling use of CPM techniques 
(CSSP 2009a, 49, 51). By 2011, case management improvements key areas (e.g., training, 
reduced caseloads, sibling placements, resource family recruitment, and medical/mental 
health care) provided evidence that the CPM had diffused throughout DCF (CSSP 2009b, 4-
5; 2011b, 3).  
 
Managing Performance Based Contracts 
 Washington. State legislation required CA use performance-based contracting 
(PBC), most notably for medical and mental health care (BOP 2009d; 2010a; 2010b; 
2010c; 2012b). Children’s Administration incorporated federal, state, and Braam 
requirements in the RFP process (BOP 2010b) and worked collaboratively with master 
contractors to develop the initial service plan with ongoing planning completed through 
family team decision meetings (BOP 2010b; 2010d). The challenge for CA was to ensure 
fidelity to the SBC model among contracted providers (BOP 2005b; 2007d). While the SBC 
approach was well received, CA experienced suboptimal service quality by PBC’s, especially 
mental health service providers (BOP 2005; 2008c). To improve use of the SBC and service 
quality, CA implemented private agency staff training for expanded front-end and preventive 
services (BOP 2010b). 
To improve consistency and quality of PBC services, CA converted and 
consolidated the number of contracts issued and managed (BOP 2010b). Following 2012 state 
legislation requiring use of PBC for case management by December 1, 2013, CA experienced 
ongoing difficulty finding PBCs willing to take full case management responsibility (BOP 
2009a; 2012c).  
New Jersey. The implementation of PBC between 2007 and 2010 resulted in 
challenges providing ongoing in-service training for staff and resource families (CSSP 2008b, 
44; 2010b, 88-89). During Phase I of the MSA in the fall of 2009, DCF appointed a Contract 
System Administrator (CSA) to serve as a single point of entry and facilitator of care for 
children accessing behavioral and mental health services from DCF (CSSP 2008b, 71; 2009a, 
8). The modification of the CSA role was a massive undertaking that required time and effort 
to manage the transition to the new referral system (CSSP 2008b, 71). The Department of 
Children and Families experienced ongoing problems with functionality, access to 
information, and clients waiting long period to get authorization for care and access to 
services (CSSP 2010a, 10). Over time, the PBC referral process improved communication 
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and service provision across a variety of agency offices (CSSP 2008b, 45). 
 
Changes in the Agency and Leadership Structure 
Washington. Frequent changes in the executive leadership composition and structure 
resulted in a loss of institutional knowledge, disruptions of stakeholder networks and 
relationships, and institutional angst (BOP 2009a). Between 2005 and 2009 there were three 
DSHS Secretaries, two CA Secretaries, and numerous other high level leadership changes 
(BOP 2009b; 2011c, 6, 4; 2012c). To cut costs, improve communication, and facilitate service 
consistency across state regions, DSHS in 2011 consolidated six regions into three with 
changes in regional director and staff roles and responsibilities for these larger regions (BOP 
2009d; 2011b; 2011c). Amid structural changes, the relative stability in regional director 
leadership provided a level of continuity in institutional knowledge, norms, and culture (BOP 
2009c).  
New Jersey. The location of DCF within DHS hampered the reform process 
(NJCWP 2005b, 7-8). Agency leaders spent considerable time and effort navigating the 
highly centralized management structure of the DHS bureaucracy (NJCWP 2005b, 10, 78). 
This led to overlapping or unclear levels of authority that contributed to delays in decision-
making (NJCWP 2005a, 7). Local managers expressed frustration with the lack of executive 
leadership and failure to respond to concerns or recommendations made at the regional or 
field level (NJCWP 2005b, 10).  
With DCF’s failure to meet required performance benchmarks under the existing 
agency structure, the plaintiffs and oversight panel pushed to make DCF independent from 
DHS with its own decision-making authority and structure (NJCWP 2005a, 75). In response 
to continued poor progress and to improve service coordination, the governor made DCF a 
cabinet level agency in July 2006 unifying various divisions into the one agency (CSSP 2007, 
15; 2009a, 2).  
Between 2006 and 2008, DCF focused on strengthening the infrastructure to support 
the implementation of the reform plan and changes in direct practice (CSSP 2009a, 5; NJCWP 
2005a, 7), most notably, decentralizing DCF operations to local offices (NJCWP 2005b, 21). 
Infrastructure changes resulted in clarity of roles and responsibilities that reduced task 
ambiguity, improved communication between the central office and field offices, and better 
information sharing between department leaders and external partners that improved 
coordination of services (CSSP 2007, 16, 40). With the infrastructure strengthened, DCF 
placed greater emphasis on system-wide changes to improve performance outcomes (CSSP 
2008b, 3; CSSP 2009a, 2, 8). 
Between 2004 and 2012, DCF experienced significant leadership change and 
organizational restructuring. Frequent high level leadership changes in the New Jew Jersey 
social services and child welfare agencies included several changes to DHS and DCF 
commissioners, DYFS directors, program administrators, and the addition of new positions 
(CSSP 2008a, 7; 2009a, 38; 2009b, 55; 2010a, 8, 60; CSSP 2010b, 6; CSSP 2011b, 3; NJCWP 
2004, 4). In 2010, area offices were consolidated from 12 to 10 to decrease operating costs 
and improve efficiency (CSSP 2010b, 7). Loss of leadership continuity from frequent periods 
with vacant offices or leaders shifting to other positions placed increased stress on structural 
capacity (CSSP 2010a, 62). The result was slowed progress on some performance 
benchmarks as the agency acclimated to changing system dynamics (CSSP 2009a, 38; 2009b, 
7, 55; 2010a, 60). 
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In July 2012, state legislation restructured DCF into four divisions with new 
divisional program and service responsibilities (CSSP 2012a, 182; 2012b, 3, 113, 126). In 
addition, substantial reductions in DCF FY2012 and FY2013 budgets resulted in insufficient 
funding support for the new organizational structure and added responsibilities resulting from 
realignment of the agency (CSSP 2012a, 182; 2012b, 161). The agency experienced declines 
in performance following the structural realignment and budget reductions (CSSP 2012a, 11, 
182).  
Structural Capacity: Planning and Development 
Washington. Children’s Administration attempted to implement multiple system-
wide changes without having in place the internal and external infrastructure to support 
extensive system reform. Four years into the reform process, workers and leaders continued 
to express frustration with the pace of change and the number of external measures being 
imposed simultaneously (BOP 2008b). With the proliferation of Braam and other 
governmental requirements, workers and leaders struggled for clarity on how to balance 
multiple and changing performance requirements (BOP 2008a; 2008b). A failure by the 
executive leadership to develop a shared understanding of the reform process and purpose of 
action steps contributed to this frustration and resulted in wide regional variations in outcome 
performance due to differing definition of performance expectations (BOP 2010b).  
The loss of institutional knowledge through frequent leadership change and staff 
turnover hampered DSHS/CA executive leaders’ ability to develop compliance plans that 
accurately reflected agency norms, culture, history, and agency capacity for change (BOP 
2009b). As a result, early compliance plans were ineffective because strategies failed to 
reflect understanding of the factors contributing to poor organizational performance (BOP 
2006a; 2007c).  
Reassessing structural capacity based on performance outcome data, revised 
compliance plans were more comprehensive with stronger strategies for system-wide changes 
specifically tied to systemic problems identified and not just performance benchmarks (BOP 
2010a). The revised strategies included incremental changes that connected actions steps to 
CAs ongoing strategic plans (BOP 2009b), created a support structure for change (e.g. clear 
expectations, emphasis on teamwork, problem-solving support networks at the regional 
level), and made annual increases in performance benchmark requirements to provide time 
for structural capacity to acclimate to the changes (BOP 2006a; 2006b; 2010a). Children’s 
Administration spent two years transitioning from activities focused on defining professional 
standards and measurement strategies before assessing performance outcomes against 
required performance benchmarks (BOP 2006b). As a result, the strategic plan was more 
effective in improving performance over time (BOP 2010a).  
New Jersey. The DCF leadership was slow and inconsistent in developing a 
comprehensive reform plan (NJCWP 2004, 4; NJCWP 2005b, 44-45). The organizational 
structure inhibited the effectiveness of action steps because responses to decision 
recommendations at the regional level were delayed due to the multilayered organizations 
structure of DCF within DHS (NJCWP 2005a, 14). This distance between service providers 
and the decision-making authority impeded decision-making at the field level and the ability 
to make timely adjustments to reform plan strategies (NJCWP 2005b, 11). In addition, DCF 
overemphasized the “enforceables” of the SA without strong implementation strategies that 
fit the structural capacity to support change (NJCWP 2005a, 7-8). System-wide changes were 
implemented simultaneously without having in place the internal and external infrastructure 
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to support the reform process (NJCWP 2005b, 7-8). The initial implementation plan included 
policy changes in field operations and child welfare assessment guidelines that failed to 
produce the desired levels of practice improvements (NJCWP 2005b, 36). Failure to routinize 
new policies and procedures of the CPM throughout DCF contributed to lack the lack of 
improvement (NJCWP 2004, 13; NJCWP 2005b, 7-8). 
 
Discussion 
The analysis of public court documents, panel meeting minutes, and monitoring 
reports related to class action litigated settlement agreements to reform the Washington State 
and New Jersey child welfare agencies revealed structural capacity issues that increase the 
understanding of factors affecting successful agency reform and the ability to achieve 
litigated performance benchmarks and outcome requirements. Both state child welfare 
agencies experienced similar challenges implementing systemic changes to achieve 
performance requirements for exit from litigated settlement agreements.  
Overall, the performance goals of the Washington State and New Jersey child 
welfare lawsuits were largely unmet with ongoing problems meeting compliance targets. 
Over twelve monitoring periods between 2006 and 2012, CA compliance rates ranged 
between 0%-10% for dour monitoring periods, 11%-30% for six periods, and 31%-57% for 
three periods. The last monitoring report showed compliance for only twelve of twenty-one 
(57%) performance outcomes. After seven years, the primary goal of the lawsuit, namely the 
reduction in multiple placements, had not been achieved.  
New Jersey’s DHS/DCF failed to reach many of its performance targets. At the end 
of 2012, DCF achieved compliance on twenty-one of fifty-four (38.9%) Phase II performance 
outcomes and continued to fall short meeting performance benchmarks in fundamental areas. 
During the first five monitored periods, outcome performance compliance increased from 
39% to 82%. However, performance declined from 69% to 52% compliance between 2009 
and 2011 with a significant drop to 29% by late 2012. After seven years, DCF had chronically 
failed to sustain performance improvements. 
Relationships and Networks 
Organizational structural capacity is highly interconnected to the extent the agency 
can engage and receive support from key stakeholders. Prior to the lawsuits, Washington and 
New Jersey child welfare agencies had weak relationship networks with key internal and 
external stakeholders that resulted in disengaged, disconnected, and poor quality services and 
lack of understanding of the support network needed to assist children and families in the 
foster care system. Both CA and DCF developed more inclusive, cooperative, and 
collaborative relationships with foster parents, other governmental agencies (e.g., school and 
health), advocacy groups, members of the court system and external organizations that 
provided programs and services used by the agency. Increased opportunities for bi-directional 
input improved agency support and the ability to assess, change, and improve program and 
service provision. 
Any litigation based reform must take into consideration the current political, 
legislative and budgetary environment. Forming positive working partnerships with the 
governor and the legislature were integral to building and sustaining structural capacity. 
Strategic plans to build structural capacity succeeded only in conjunction with reliable 
political and legislative support. For CA and DCF, the legislature played a significant role in 
removing barriers preventing completion of agency tasks by maintaining sufficient funding 
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for programs and services and passing legislation that supported agency operations. In 
Washington and New Jersey, the relationship between the agency and the legislature was 
changed when a litigated reform plan came into play. Settlement agreement provisions 
empowered the agency leaders to implement changes in policy, gave the agency budgetary 
leverage, and provided the court with the authority to require increased appropriations for 
programs directly affected by the litigated remedy.  
Infrastructure and Process Capacity 
The ability of an organization to develop structures and processes that support the 
utilization of available resources and strategic aims is integral to sustained reform (Boigey 
and Cumenal 2011, 7). Infrastructure and process capacity of Washington’s CA and New 
Jersey’s DCF was overwhelmed by frequent leadership change, problems integrating and 
managing information technology, implementing a new professional practice model, and use 
of performance based contracting. 
Agency leadership plays an integral role in the level of structural capacity and leader 
or leadership structure changes can shift agency preferences and reform strategies related to 
performance outcome compliance (Bertelli 2004, 34). Through commitment to the reform 
process and bi-directional communication, leaders serve an important role in creating a shared 
vision for the agency that is diffused throughout the system in its norms and culture (Romzek 
2000, 427). A shared vision serves as the backbone to building capacity for change among 
front-line workers and supervisors (Shackelford et al. 2007, 121).  
Frequent high-level leadership change creates organizational uncertainty and 
anxiety over the strategic focus on how to achieve the mission and goals tied to the agency’s 
vision (Romzek 2000, 427). Leadership transitions require rebuilding of relationships with 
internal members, external stakeholders, government leaders, and the legislature. Following 
a leadership change, not only is institutional knowledge, understanding, and experience with 
the reform process lost, but time and productivity is lost as well as a new leader develops trust 
and confidence in workers, becomes acclimated to the agency’s structure and culture, and 
develops an understanding of organizational capacity to handle change. Declines in 
performance during and after leadership change for Washington and New Jersey child welfare 
agencies demonstrated the importance of stabilizing leadership structures before and 
throughout the reform process.  
State child welfare agencies must manage information across a variety of service 
and performance domains. The extent that information is timely, accurate, accessible, and 
reliable affects the level of data fidelity to provide a true reflection of organizational capacity. 
When data depicts the actual level of structural capacity, decision-making and strategic plans 
for reform are more likely to lead to positive change without overwhelming system capacity 
during the process. Foundational to structural capacity is having in place information 
technology networks that support day-to-day operations and long-term strategic planning. 
Any attempts at structural capacity building must begin with an assessment of the strength of 
organizational information systems (Hall et al. 2003, 6). Lack of expertise and support in 
using information technology, technical problems, ongoing upgrades and maintenance of 
database information systems are the most frequently cited problems that negatively impact 
infrastructure and process capacity (Hall et al. 2003, 40). This was the case in the Washington 
and New Jersey child welfare systems. Both agencies entered litigated reform during 
conversion to an upgraded SACWIS case management system that required a significant 
expenditure of time and resources to transfer data, debug problems, and train to competency 
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leaders, managers, and field level workers.  
The ability to derive data in a form that provides relevant information for accurately 
assessing client needs, performance, or decision-making is crucial to reform (Kloby 2012, 
31). Both CA and DCF experienced ongoing information technology management problems 
with workers struggling to navigate the SACWIS system, filtering massive amounts of data, 
keeping current with data input requirements, and utilizing information for decision-making. 
Failure by leaders to accommodate in strategic plans problems with system conversion, 
training, support and diffusion of technology throughout the child welfare system led to 
decreased perform due to loss of information continuity, inability to maintain quality 
assurance programs, and lack of knowledge management competency and decision-making 
at the supervisory and field-levels.  
A well-diffused professional practice model is essential to developing and 
maintaining strong infrastructure and process capacity to support institutional tasks. Within 
child welfare agencies, worker competency is influenced by the extent the organizational 
structure supports a model with specified standards of practice and quality assurance 
mechanism that promote model fidelity in daily operations (Vincent 2012, 9). Washington 
and New Jersey leaders struggled to support mid- and field-level supervisors’ efforts to 
understand the principles and values of the model and then train agency workers to 
competency levels in its use. Lack of understanding of the model among attorneys, judges, 
and other external agencies or service providers inhibited the ability of the agency to provide 
services at performance target levels. The experience of CA and DCF highlight the 
importance of having a well-defined pre-service and in-service training program with 
accessible support networks and spot checks for competency maintenance.  
Washington and New Jersey child welfare agency leaders were mandated to use 
performance-based contracting (PBC) which required managing multiple performance 
outcomes without complete control over the internal policies, procedures, and quality 
assurance mechanism PBC agencies used to carry out provider tasks. As a result, CA and 
DCF experienced difficulty managing how PBCs defined and measured service provision 
related to settlement agreement performance outcome and benchmark targets. When PBCs 
failed to meet performance standards, few replacement alternatives capable of providing 
agency services were available. State governments increasingly are turning to privatization 
of services.  
 
Planning and Development 
Initial failure at agency reform in Washington and New Jersey demonstrated the 
importance of developing an internal structural capacity to support change. Pressure to make 
quick fixes was felt acutely by leadership, management, and front-line workers who struggled 
with the pace of change. Both Washington and New Jersey leaders initially focused on 
meeting the enforced provisions of the settlement agreement. This led to compliance plans 
with weak strategies that failed to incorporate knowledge about current policies, procedures, 
norms, relationship networks, and overall system capacity for change. Leaders failed on two 
fronts: not building capacity of the lower-level management structure to handle change and 
introducing too many changes simultaneously that overwhelmed the agency’s structural 
capacity for change.  
Developing an implementation plan that phased in changes helped leaders maintain 
structural capacity to handle reform measures by providing opportunities for the system to 
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adapt to change over time and allowing leaders to make adjustments during the process before 
the system became overwhelmed. For both CA and DCF, an incremental reform approach in 
later plans resulted in greater performance improvement gains.  
Institutional knowledge plays a key role in decision-making and development and 
implementation of strategic plans. Loss of institutional knowledge caused disruptions in care 
due to lost productivity, lack of familiarity navigating the bureaucratic organizational 
structure, time needed to build working relationships with internal organizational members, 
external service providers, and other stakeholders. Institutional knowledge develops over 
time and experience within the agency and provides an understanding of the inner workings 
of the organization within a real-world day-to-day context. Frequent leader changes and high 
worker turnover resulted in a loss of institutional knowledge continuity about the capacity of 
the agency’s organizational structure, processes, norms, and culture to accommodate 
organizational change.  
 
Conclusion 
The ability of a state child welfare agency to fulfill its mission and goals of providing 
for the safety, permanency, and well-being of the children and families served by the agency 
is highly dependent on the strength of the organizational structural capacity to support agency 
tasks. Insufficient structural capacity led to long-term chronic failures of the Washington 
State and New Jersey child welfare systems to provide appropriate and competent levels of 
care and safeguard of the children and clients served by the agency. Three significant 
structural capacity weaknesses played an integral role in the overall failure of both 
Washington and New Jersey to achieve and sustain performance improvements within the 
context of litigated reform and court enforced settlement agreement provisions. These 
weaknesses included; (a) failure to diffuse the new professional practice model; (b) state 
mandated privatization of primary agency functions through performance based contracting; 
and (c) inconsistent executive leadership. 
First, the diffusion of the principles of a new professional practice model throughout 
the agency system was integral to improvement on performance measures related to direct 
fieldwork that included caseworker monthly visitation, case assessment, planning, 
implementation, and team meetings to coordinate client care. In terms of training and support, 
there was a lack of structural capacity for training, coaching, and mentoring to facilitate 
diffusion of the practice model principles. Outmoded and inconsistent training and support of 
the practice model led to inadequate knowledge acquisition and skill development that 
contributed to poor performance in key areas related to direct services to clients. Supervisors 
and caseworkers consistently failed to translate what they learned in the classroom to agency 
tasks. The diffusion process was inhibited further by insufficient attention given to routinizing 
new policies and procedures that translated the principles of the practice model into real world 
actions. The poor diffusion was exacerbated by a failure of the agency leadership to link the 
principles of the practice model to the settlement agreement performance outcome measures. 
In addition, incomplete diffusion of the practice model was evident in ongoing difficulty of 
external partners and stakeholders within the larger child welfare system understanding and 
incorporating model principles. Key structural capacity weaknesses that contributed to failure 
to meet performance measures related to the new practice model included time to practice 
and obtain feedback on use of model principles, insufficient supervisory support, problems 
imputing and accessing current and reliable information from the SACWIS data system, and 
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the consistent application of the model principles throughout the entire child welfare system. 
Second, multi-layered bureaucratic organizations are reliant on collaboration and 
coordination with multiple internal and external program and service providers. Misalignment 
of protocols can inhibit effective service and lead to poor performance. State mandated use 
of privatized performance based contractors of primary child welfare agency functions (e.g., 
case management, provision of medical/mental health services) contributed to a failure to 
meet performance outcome targets. There was a failure to develop an effective division and 
coordination of programs and services across the state child welfare, court, and human 
services systems. Suboptimal quality of services by performance based contractors 
contributed to a failure to achieve performance outcome requirements related to case planning 
and management and providing appropriate and consistent medical and mental health 
evaluations and treatment/care. In addition to the challenges of aligning contracted services 
with the settlement agreement requirements, agency leaders experienced difficulty 
monitoring and evaluating contracted services related to performance outcome measures due 
to the inability to acquire reliable quality assurance data from contracted providers.  
 Third, inconsistent executive leadership contributed to an inaccurate assessment of the 
level of agency structural capacity to support the pace and extent of reform and the inability 
to respond expediently to failures to achieve or sustain performance outcome targets. 
Frequent leadership changes throughout the agency resulted in poor delineation of job roles 
and responsibilities that created conflict or confusion over decision-making authority and 
accountability linked to performance measures. Frequent movement of executive leaders 
within and out of the agency system negatively affected creating and modifying performance 
outcome definitions, translating performance definitions into actionable policies and 
procedures, linking implementation actions steps to performance measures, and 
communicating this information throughout the system. Leaders failed to create a shared 
vision for change by focusing on the enforceable performance measures rather than using the 
settlement agreement as an opportunity for deeper systemic reform by connecting the required 
performance measures more broadly to the mission and goals of the agency.  
Both the Washington State and New Jersey child welfare systems engaged in a 
protracted reform process prompted by class action litigation intended to prompt system 
changes to improve program and service provision performance. Washington and New Jersey 
leaders felt considerable pressure both internal and external to the agency to show substantive 
change in meeting litigated reform requirements within a difficult political and economic 
environment. As demonstrated by the efforts at reforming these two publicly administered 
agencies, it is essential when implementing change within such a large complex bureaucratic 
agency that the focus is first on taking the time and expense of creating organizational 
structural capacity sufficient to accommodate system-wide changes in policies, procedures, 
and professional practice.  
Finally, there were several challenges and limitations to the study. Data collected 
was limited to information accessible to the public and was published in aggregate form. The 
massive amount of data available created analysis challenges in terms of data management. 
In addition, unpublished meeting minutes as well as interviews of key individuals involved 
in the litigation and implementation of the provisions of the settlement agreement would have 
provided greater depth of understanding of issues most relevant to success implementing 
litigated based reform.  
The case study analysis was limited to organizational structural capacity issues while 
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recognizing that human resource and financial capacity are interrelated factors that affect 
overall capacity to achieve agency mission and goals. Important factors were not investigated 
that warrant study in future research. State legislation can affect substantially the alignment 
of programs and services provided by the child welfare agency. Legislation can weaken or 
strengthen organizational structural capacity by affecting agency leadership, communication, 
authority and decision-making structures, resource allocations, and support of litigated 
settlement agreement provisions. In both states, legislation privatizing agency programs and 
services through mandated use of performance based contracts directly affected agency 
performance on several outcome measures by changing the nature of decision-making 
authority and accountability. The economic environment, budget allocations, and funding of 
programs and services was also an area not investigated that has serious ramifications on the 
ability of the agency to meet performance outcome targets. An in-depth analysis of budgetary 
and funding issues would provide invaluable information about the best allocation of 
monetary resources to the reform process. It would be informative to understand the links 
between litigated reform, court authority to force changes in state funding of the child welfare 
agency, and how state legislatures resolve budgetary constraints and funding conflicts (e.g., 
services mandated by the settlement agreement but not the state) within the context of litigated 
settlement agreement performance outcome requirements.  
i The New Jersey child welfare system went through several name changes during the litigated 
reform. To avoid confusion and for consistency in the discussion, the New Jersey child 
welfare system is referred to as the Division of Children and Families (DCF) throughout the 
entire discussion.  
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